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The Dynamics of Open Strategy: From Adoption to Reversion
Melissa M. Appleyard, Henry W. Chesbrough
Innovation has become more open in recent years. Yet the decision to become more open and the challenge of sustaining that openness
are not well understood. This is the concern of the “content” branch of Open Strategy, deﬁned as the branch that addresses an organization’s open innovation strategy. We examine the initial motivations to adopt an open strategy, and then consider when organizations
choose to maintain that open strategy or revert to a more proprietary approach. Similarly, we examine motivations to open up a previously proprietary strategy. We ﬁnd that these dynamics depend on the organization’s desire to either foster greater growth (which
favors a more open strategy) or secure greater control and proﬁt directly from the innovation (which favors a more proprietary strategy).
Crucially, these choices can shift over the life cycle of a market and are dependent on the competencies amassed by the organization. In
early phases, when there are relatively few legacy customers and many new arrivals, open strategies attract customers at a faster rate. In
later phases, as the market matures and new arrivals have slowed, there are few new customers to attract with an open strategy and
reversion to a more proprietary strategy becomes quite attractive. This suggests that the longevity of open initiatives might be curtailed as
organizations opt for value capture over cooperative value creation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Introduction
If we are to make strategic sense of innovation communities, ecosystems, networks, and their implications for
competitive advantage, we propose that a new approach to strategy d open strategy d is needed.
d Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007: 58
Since the publication of Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) nearly a decade ago, there has been signiﬁcant interest in Open
Strategy but limited attention has been paid to the dynamics that characterize a ﬁrm’s pursuit of this new approach to
strategy. Two branches of Open Strategy have emerged: a “content” branch that examines the ability of organizations to
sustain themselves economically with an open approach to innovation (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007); and a “process”
branch that explores the systems that can enhance strategy formulation by furthering participation of both internal and
external actors and improving transparency inside and outside of the ﬁrm (Whittington et al., 2011). While other papers in
this special issue address this latter branch, this research provides a framework for examining the content branch of Open
Strategy from adoption to d under certain circumstances d its abandonment. In our context, we deﬁne abandonment as
reversion to a proprietary strategy. We have witnessed these dynamics in industries ranging from life sciences to consumer
packaged goods, and in this paper, we particularly focus on examples from the information and communications technology
(ICT) and software industries, such as the evolution of the Android operating system. The analysis draws on existing literature
pertaining to the role of knowledge accumulation, network effects, and ecosystem development in fueling cross-ﬁrm
cooperation when a new market is emerging, complemented by interviews from leading ﬁrms that contribute extensively
to open innovation initiatives including IBM and Intel. We ﬁnd that the decision to either open up a previously closed project
(i.e., abandon property rights protection) or close off a previously open project (i.e., revert to a proprietary strategy) hinges on
the evolving realities of the market including rate of product adoption and the emergence of a supporting ecosystem, as well
as changes in the competencies accumulated by the cooperating ﬁrms.
Prior research has observed that open innovation is leading to new empirical phenomena that do not ﬁt well with Porterian theories of business strategy (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; West and Gallagher, 2006).
The primary tension between Open Strategy and traditional business-level strategy rests with the need to secure an economic
return in the face of relinquishing control over critical strategic assets and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Dwoskin, 2016; Peteraf,
1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). The reconciliation of this tension is how we deﬁne Open Strategy: a ﬁrm’s justiﬁcation for
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2016.07.004
0024-6301/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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participating in an open initiative, including its ability to capture value from the initiative. In our application of Open Strategy,
an open initiative is characterized by: a) the reliance on assets outside of the ﬁrm’s boundaries (inclusion), and b) the (free)
access to project results by outsiders (transparency). By way of example, in the setting of an open source software (OSS)
project, contributions to the code base might span hundreds of software developers who are freelancers, afﬁliated with nonproﬁt organizations, or employed by companies. The compilation of their individual contributions leads to a new software
product, e.g., the well-known example of Linux, which is published in the public domain. This pooling of assets externally
leads to a high-quality, freely accessible product, and because of this open access, the participating ﬁrms then have to
construct business models to capture value elsewhere in the value chain (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Perr et al., 2010).
The participating ﬁrms also need to decide their level of commitment to openness over the life of the project, and the drivers
behind this decision are the focus of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce a conceptual framework for
considering the range of strategic possibilities between open and closed innovation initiatives and provide examples. We then
analyze the foundations of value creation during open innovation through a producer and consumer surplus lens. The
subsequent section details the basis for collaboration and the factors that might lead to a shift in strategic choice, including
the possibility of reversion. The following section goes more deeply into internal competencies that traditional ﬁrms have
grappled with to effectively support open initiatives. Included is a consideration of how successful cultivation of competencies, the technology prowess competency in particular, might actually hasten reversion back to a closed strategy. The
triggers of reversion have not received extensive treatment in the literature, and they help to inform the limits of open
innovation. In the ﬁnal sections, we discuss the ﬁndings and conclude with possible paths for future research.

A dynamic view of open strategy
The primary research contributions of this paper are: 1) to demonstrate how a ﬁrm’s commitment to Open Strategy may
be far from static; and 2) to identify the underlying forces driving the migration of strategic choice. In this section, we
introduce an intertemporal framework for understanding the range of strategic choices with illustrative examples. Typically,
past researchers have emphasized the strategic decision to own and control intellectual property in order to earn a revenue
stream to pay for research and development (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Nordhaus, 1969; Romer, 1990). Or they have
emphasized a perpetual commitment to open, user-led innovation (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Shah and Tripsas, 2007;
Swann, 2014; von Hippel, 2005), where one’s ability to beneﬁt directly from the use of an innovation obviates any need to
appropriate economic value from that innovation. However, these otherwise highly contrasting approaches share a common
characteristic: once the strategic choice is made to be open or to be proprietary, that decision is implicitly treated as ﬁxed
thereafter. Recent examples reveal that this is an incomplete reﬂection of reality, where some projects that began as proprietary have moved to become open, while other projects that began as open have subsequently become proprietary. The
choice of openness thus is not static, but dynamic. An examination of ﬁrms that have moved along the OpeneClosed strategy
continuum can help illustrate the dynamics. Figure 1 shows how companies and open projects might start with an Open or

Open

Cisco: OpenDaylight

Linux

IBM: PC

Apache

Sun: Java

Drupal

Mozilla
Ex Post

Closed

IBM: Mainframe

Google: Apps

Microsoft: Windows

Google: Android OS

Oracle

Amazon: Kindle Fire

Closed

Open

Ex Ante

Figure 1. Dynamics behind the OpeneClosed Strategic Choice
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Closed strategy (“Ex Ante”) and remain in that initial state over time (“Ex Post”). These two strategic choices constitute the
main diagonal of Figure 1.
The literature provides extensive treatment of the ClosedeClosed strategy (Porter, 1980), where the organizations pursuing this strategy wall off their innovation initiatives from external contributors, both at the outset and over time. Following
this strategy, companies like IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle have enjoyed lucrative proﬁt streams from their proprietary products
and services.
Similarly, the literature is replete with examples of the phenomenon of OpeneOpen initiatives (Allen, 1983; Baldwin and
von Hippel, 2011; von Hippel, 2005; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Three enduring open source software (OSS) projects
represent the OpeneOpen approach in Figure 1: Linux, Apache and Drupal. They also constitute a breed of innovation where
(advanced) users are themselves the innovators (Franke and Shah, 2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Lerner and Tirole,
2002; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Raymond, 2001). They have managed to sustain their commitment to openness over
time, something we worried greatly about in previous work (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007).
A novel contribution of this paper is to focus on the “off-diagonals” of Figure 1, for the main diagonal in the ﬁgure does not
represent all of the possible options ﬁrms face. In the off-diagonal quadrants, projects can migrate from Closed to Open or
from Open to Closed. As an example of the former, in 2013, Cisco coordinated the launch of the OpenDaylight initiative. This
open source software project is in effect taking some of the intelligence out of Cisco’s proprietary network hardware and
putting it into an openly available software layer. IBM’s PC business similarly started out as initially closed, but rapidly
developed into a de facto open standard, driven in large part by the actions of Intel and Microsoft supporting “IBM compatible”
PC systems (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). The history of Java also followed this pattern, where the shepherds of Java at Sun
switched Java’s license to a more open one in 2006 (Fisher, 2006). Mozilla, the free web browser, resulted from the aftermath
of Netscape’s battle with Microsoft in the mid-1990s in the so-called Browser Wars.
The reverse ﬂow also arises. Two examples of the Open to Closed migration are Amazon’s build-out of the Kindle Fire
ecosystem and Google’s management of the Android operating system and related apps. To launch its Kindle tablet, Amazon
adapted, or “forked,” a version of Android to create its Fire operating system and developed its own application programming
interfaces (APIs) that would dictate how applications would connect to the operating system (Pon et al., 2014). This allowed
Amazon to control the speciﬁcations of the apps that the Kindle and other Amazon devices could use. This control ensured
that Amazon would be able to integrate its range of services into apps sold in its Appstore, allowing customers to access not
only the digital content that they purchased through Amazon but the expanding range of services like cloud storage and
streaming media (Pon et al., 2014). Because of the very small marketshare of Amazon Fire devices relative to the whole
Android universe, only one-tenth the number of apps have been developed for Fire relative to Google’s app store (Pon et al.,
2014).1
While Amazon pursued a closed Fire ecosystem after adapting an open operating system, the closing off of Android under
Google’s leadership has been more oblique. After Google acquired Android in 2005, it opened up the source code to draw in a
broad developer base to propel adoption (Open Handset Alliance, 2007), consistent with the positive feedback effects of
Shapiro and Varian (1999). Initially, the open approach succeeded in attracting a large and vibrant ecosystem to Android to
catch up to Apple’s iOS operating system, as it was intended to do. That is not the end of the Android story, however. Over
time, as Android has surpassed Apple’s operating system in unit market share in the smartphone arena (Business Wire, 2014),
Google has progressively closed off Android through a variety of means. Google has inserted two layers of proprietary control
(Amadeo, 2013). The ﬁrst is Google’s migration of open source-derived apps to closed source versions provided and maintained exclusively by Google, in the form of Google apps, such as the Calendar and Camera. Google will continue its nowproprietary apps into the future, without any further sharing back to the initial open source versions.
The second way Google is closing off the Android platform is by extracting functionality out of the operating system and
placing it in a new proprietary “app” called Play Services (Amadeo, 2013; Pon et al., 2014). This is a classic envelopment
strategy, in the language of Eisenmann et al. (2011). Play Services provides systems-level capabilities like account syncing and
Googleþ connectivity required for the smooth functioning of Google’s now-proprietary apps found in the Play Store. This
means that Google can update Play Services frequently without having to rely on infrequent, major Android operating system
updates. It also means that companies like Samsung, who has tried to mimic the functionality of Google’s proprietary apps via
its own suite of apps, may have difﬁculty “inventing around” this new systems-level app, thereby becoming even more
beholden to Google. It further means that individual volunteer contributors have no future role to play in this integration of
services.
While Android is indeed licensed through the Apache Software License (Android, 2014), which is an open source license,
Google has in effect closed off Android without much public notice or outcry. While these methods are most likely perfectly
legal, in our view they violate the spirit of open source development, turning Android into “more of a ‘look but don’t touch’
kind of open” (Amadeo, 2013). They also qualify some of the more extravagant claims of open source proponents of
“democratizing innovation” (e.g., von Hippel, 2005). The reversion to a proprietary strategy suggests that the initial open

1
As Pon et al. (2014) analyze, their very different strategies around welcoming apps into their respective stores reﬂects the different business models
pursed by Amazon (retail sales) and Google (advertising). What remains to be seen is whether Google’s strategy of shifting functionality out of Android and
into Play Services as described below will hobble Amazon in the long-run when Amazon wants to upgrade Fire, or whether “OS-agnostic” apps like those
based on HTLM5 might lessen the importance of the operating system.
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approach was a strategy to gain rapid adoption, subject to later revision if circumstances warranted it. Open need not imply a
commitment to remain open in perpetuity.
The underlying value created by open and closed strategies
The question becomes, why does such migration away from the main diagonal pattern occur? Why do initially Closed
strategies shift to Open, and why do initially Open strategies shift to Closed? This section presents the underlying gains that
accrue to producer surplus or consumer surplus…or both from the Open or Closed strategic choice. As these underlying gains
shift, so too can the optimal choice of strategy.
In the ClosedeClosed cell of Figure 1, ﬁrms enjoy the (temporary) monopoly proﬁts afforded by intellectual property
rights, along with the high barriers to competition that drive the Five Forces analysis of Michael Porter (Porter, 1980). The
producer surplus is increased by having control over price and quantity. In the OpeneOpen cell, the user-innovators
capture a share of the returns from both increased producer and consumer surplus because they are not only the creators but also typically the consumers of the output (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Baldwin et al., 2006; Swann, 2014). They
can also beneﬁt from providing complementary goods and services which need not be open, a topic we discussed
extensively in our earlier paper (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). In the Close-Open and Open-Closed cells, producer and
consumer surplus evolve with the growth of the market and drive the inter-temporal migration of strategy in ways we
discuss below.
Producer surplus in open initiatives
Speciﬁcally considering open initiatives, the contributions to producer surplus can be characterized in terms of cost,
quality, speed, and coordination. The momentum surrounding an open project can draw in vast numbers of contributors as
seen in many of the successful open source software projects.2 This can drive down costs of production while enhancing
quality because of the sheer volume of contributors and their diversity. The often reduced and shared cost of development can
lead to a greater number of experiments running in parallel, which can shorten development cycles (Baldwin and Clark,
2000), and because transparency is a hallmark of open projects (Whittington et al., 2011), results can be disseminated in a
more timely and broader fashion. As Google has demonstrated through the initial open build-out of the Android ecosystem, a
further beneﬁt of openness is, in quick order, to coordinate a critical mass of players to launch a new platform. This allowed
Google to overcome a late start even in a setting with strong network effects at a time when ﬁrst Microsoft’s and then Apple’s
ecosystem had threatened to dominate the smartphone market (Pon et al., 2014; West and Gallagher, 2006).3
Consumer surplus in open initiatives
From the perspective of consumer surplus, openness generates value for consumers through price, features, and selfdetermination. Price generally is lower than proprietary alternatives when the output is freely available, like freely downloadable open source software, and when value can be captured elsewhere in the value chain. Android can be viewed as an
example of where this latter downward force on price has occurred. Google does not need to charge for use of its Android
operating system, because the company can rely on downstream revenues from a complementary good, paid search.4
Regarding features, user-developers can make contributions to the open project to address their speciﬁc needs. As Shapiro
and Varian (1999) and Swann (2014) demonstrate, a boost to consumer surplus can be realized when users are freed from
the lock-in of proprietary systems in favor of open regimes of self-determination. Open projects thus maximize consumer
surplus by allowing customers to enjoy desired (or even tailored) features at a lower price while avoiding lock-in to a
particular company’s ecosystem.
In sum, when deciding in which cell to be, companies need to weigh the monopoly rents from ClosedeClosed versus the
“double-agent” returns of the OpeneOpen cell (where the innovator also is the user) (David, 2001), which are inﬂuenced by
the value created through producer and consumer surplus. But as the value shifts over time due to the factors analyzed below,
ﬁrms can ﬁnd their strategies drifting across the diagonals of Figure 1.
The factors driving strategic choice
The payoffs to consumer and producer surplus can precipitate the migration of strategy, and this section examines how
this occurs through user-driven, ﬁrm-driven, and market-driven forces. The analysis also introduces the notion that ﬁrms

2

Crowdsourced innovation projects in a variety of sectors also have attracted a considerable number and variety of contributors (Hautz et al., 2010).
This desire to fuel adoption of a new technology standard lays at the heart of Tesla’s announcement about opening up its patent portfolio (Musk, 2014).
This is another setting with strong network effects, and Tesla, as a late entrant, is partnering with established ﬁrms Nissan and Toyota to build out a joint
charging network in the United States.
4
As some observers in Silicon Valley put it: “If you are not paying for the product, you ARE the product.” See Chesbrough and Appleyard (2007) for more
examples of how ﬁrms can proﬁt from open approaches.
3
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might actually pursue a hybrid strategy that exhibits features of both a Closed and Open strategy reﬂecting the interaction
between user and ﬁrm preferences.
Our ﬁrst consideration is the rationale behind moving from a Closed to Open strategy and how the beneﬁts accruing to
users can help spur such movement. Firms following Closed strategies based on competitive barriers such as intellectual
property rights, by and large do a good job of capturing value via higher prices and a larger producer surplus (Shapiro and
Varian, 1999), which explains why many ﬁrms choose a closed strategy initially. However, closed strategies need to
generate enough consumer surplus to entice customers to buy their offering. Knowing that the offering is closed and thus
must be purchased “off-the-shelf,” customers must derive considerable value to motivate them to buy. The obvious rationale
to open up an initially closed strategy is that the offering failed to generate enough value to attract enough customers to
sustain the closed strategy. This was the case with Mozilla, for example. Microsoft’s bundling of its Explorer browser with the
Windows operating system created an insuperable barrier for Netscape Navigator. The latter had to be downloaded and
installed in order to be used, while Microsoft’s offering was already installed, and offered for free.
In response, Netscape eventually decided to release an open-source version of its Navigator browser, called Mozilla. While
it could no longer sustain the further development of this browser on its own in competition with Microsoft, it reasoned that
an open community might want an extensible browser that users and developers could modify as they wished. Mozilla
remains a viable browser option to this day, twenty years after it was put into open source. So Netscape’s calculation proved to
be prescient.
This example of Closed to Open migration reﬂects how the payoffs captured by “user-innovators” can lead to strategic
change. The increased payoffs to users derive from improved features, self-determination, and a reduced price can accrue as
follows:
(1) The beneﬁts attributable to “self-service,” i.e., allowing users to tailor the product to their needs (Chesbrough and
Appleyard, 2007), can offset relative costs penalties d a higher cost of installation in the case of Mozilla.
(2) An additional beneﬁt of an open source alternative is the elimination of software licensing fees. The pressure by lead
users for an open source alternative to bring down such fees helped persuade Cisco to initiative the OpenDaylight
project (Duffy, 2013), another Closed-to-Open example in Figure 1. Many of these lead users subsequently contributed
code to the project.
The less-studied case is the movement from Open to Closed in Figure 1. The factors inﬂuencing such movement can be
grouped into ﬁrm-driven and market-driven categories.
The ﬁrm-driven factors depend on the strategic calculus of the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm contemplating abandonment of an open
initiative might weigh the following, which reﬂect the dynamics of producer surplus related to achieving product quality,
coordination across the ecosystem, speed of deployment, and threats to proﬁtability:
(1) Has the ﬁrm accumulated enough internal technology prowess to guarantee quality and carry the initiative forward
without the help of the community? This factor will be considered in greater detail below.
(2) A major part of making most open initiatives successful is the emergence of a supporting ecosystem. Has the ﬁrm’s
ability to manage all of the associated touch-points with the open initiative, i.e., its “Architectural Management,” been
honed enough? For example, in the Android case above, as Google reverts to a proprietary approach, it needs to manage
not only the Android operating system, but also the relationships across the ecosystem spanning the independent apps
developers, the handset makers, and the telephony and Wi-Fi service providers. Have the ecosystem partners
continued to invest in and support the offering? If not, maybe they are not adding much value anymore. Or if they have,
might there be the risk that they actually take control of the offering (as occurred with Intel and Microsoft with the IBM
PC)?
(3) Another critical player in the ecosystem is the customer. If a ﬁrm were to close off a project, has its Architectural
Management team forged a strong and credible relationship with the user base, such that there will not be mass
defection if they fully take over the project, close it off, and move it in-house? When considering the customer
response, the customer base can be usefully separated into legacy customers (who have already invested substantial
time and money into the offering) and newly arriving customers (who have not).
(4) Has there been a dissipation of interest within the sponsoring ﬁrms, because the results from the open project have
fulﬁlled their goals or have fallen short of the goals (Schweik and English, 2012)?
(5) Has the success of an open initiative prompted a ﬁrm to acquire it and close it down? This can occur if the open
initiative threatens the proﬁtability of a main line of business of the potential acquirer, as in the example of Oracle’s
acquisition of Sleepycat, after which Oracle changed the Sleepycat software license to make adoption of the open
version much less attractive (Phipps, 2013).
The market-driven factors address the evolution of the customer base and the preservation of the customer experience.
They blend the payoffs to consumer and producer surplus:
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(1) Firms involved in an open initiative must develop business models that balance value creation with value capture. The
arrival rate of new customers into the market addressed by the open initiative drives value creation. Therefore when
markets are small and arrivals are high, there are beneﬁts to an open approach from the customers’ perspective,
because they value not having to “lock-in” to a proprietary architecture (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) and appreciate
expanded product choice. Open accelerates adoption faster than Closed, because consumers are beneﬁting from selfdetermination while producers are beneﬁting from coordination and speed of adoption.
However, when markets become large and the arrival of new customers slows, this reduces the further beneﬁts of
remaining open. The strategic emphasis shifts from value creation to value capture. The motivations behind such a shift
parallel those behind the migration from exploration to exploitation in high-risk environments (March, 1991; Raisch et al.,
2009; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Smith et al., 2010; Volberda et al., 2001).
(2) As markets mature, customers also care about the stability of the product platform, when either there is a steep
learning curve to use the product or the need for interoperability with complementary goods and services. The consumer desires feature stability and the producer wants the ecosystem to achieve a seamless customer experience.
These desires are particularly salient when a large proportion of the customer’s employees need to be trained to use the
product or related integrated system (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The customer’s desire for stability is a conceivable
argument behind Google’s decision to close off the Android operating system.
Closing off Android means that Google decreases the likelihood of the source code being “forked” into multiple versions
for which they could not guarantee quality or compatibility. The argument is that excessive fragmentation could
complicate the customer experience to the point that customers defect for a more stable platform such as Apple’s.
These effects can be synthesized along two dimensions: the “LiberalizationeControl” continuum, which reﬂects the ﬁrm’s
assessment of the ﬁrm-driven factors; and the “VarietyeStability” continuum, which reﬂects the market-driven factors
inﬂuenced by customer behavior (Figure 2). The interactions of the two dimensions can add subtleties to the ﬁrm’s strategic
choice. The “Closed” quadrant in Figure 2 reﬂects the situation described in the market-driven factor (2) above when customers would be willing to lock into a stable, closed system like Apple’s iOS to ensure the customer experience does not
appreciably change over time. In contrast, customers might favor feature variety d and even the ability to create their own
features d so a project with these characteristics like Linux would be in the “Open” quadrant.

Customer Preference
Variety
Internal Versioning

Open

(e.g., MicrosoŌ: Xbox)

(e.g., Linux)

Lead Innovator’s
Preference
LiberalizaƟon

Control
Closed

External Versioning

(e.g., Apple: iOS)

(e.g., Intel: Dual Source)

Stability
Figure 2. The Interaction between Innovator and Customer in Strategy Creation

To understand the off-diagonal quadrants, we consider strategic choices that are composites of open and closed characteristics. These quadrants demonstrate the possibility that ﬁrms may choose a more nuanced strategy by relaxing the
binary choice between Open and Closed. An example of a strategy that ensures stability but loosens intellectual property
rights ownership occurs when a ﬁrm guarantees a second source for its product (Shapiro and Varian, 1999), which again
reﬂects a customer demanding stability. The requirement of a second source is common in critical applications, e.g., technologies used in the national defense arena. Companies that supply such technologies, like IBM, can require that their parts
suppliers, like Intel, license their chip technologies to a second source of supply, like AMD.5 Unlike the example of stability
leading to a Closed strategy, this quest for stability would instead require Intel to relax, or “liberalize,” its control over its
product by licensing its chip design to AMD. This customer requirement would force Intel to open up and move into the
hybrid “External Versioning” quadrant of Figure 2.

5

IBM also obtained a manufacturing license to Intel’s microprocessor design, so that it could act as its own second source.
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The dynamics behind the movement from the Closed quadrant to “Internal Versioning” could be driven by pressure from
the customers for new features, or greater variety, rather than greater stability. Internal Versioning allows a ﬁrm to maintain
control over much of its intellectual property portfolio but open up enough to allow others to develop complements that
would work with a ﬁrm’s core technology. An example can be drawn from the video gaming industry. In this industry, new
generations of consoles allow for enhanced graphics capabilities and engagement with game play. To enter this industry,
superior technology prowess is required to make a new console so compelling that the barriers to entry from network effects
are broken and gamers are willing to switch to the new system. But over subsequent generations of the console, the customers would want to be able to use their library of games, so the console maker would need to balance backward
compatibility with new features. This balance is also affected by the number of newly arriving customers relative to legacy
customers.
Internal Versioning is deﬁned as this ability of incumbents to release multiple generations of propriety systems to satisfy
customers’ desire for variety and feature improvement. Microsoft demonstrated this ability to marshal internal technology
prowess to enter the console industry with the Xbox (Takahashi, 2011), and exhibited sensitivity to backward compatibility in
subsequent generations. Microsoft also understood the need to relax control to attract complementors namely independent
game developers, thus embracing some horizontal movement in Figure 2 toward Liberalization. As an example of this
commitment to foster complements, at the time of launch, one of Xbox’s marquee game titles, Halo, had originated outside of
the company.
This analysis suggests the broad and nuanced presence of these kinds of OpeneClosed dynamics across industries, and
while a lead innovator may lean towards preferring a Closed strategy based on proprietary technology, customers may force
migration to a more Open strategy to reduce their lock-in, while beneﬁtting from positive network effects, technological
advancement, and engaged complementors.
Enabling competencies
A ﬁrm’s ability to capture the gains to its strategic choice ultimately dictates its willingness to sustain participation in open
initiatives, but which competencies inside the ﬁrm most effectively enable value capture? Two critical competencies that
contribute to a ﬁrm’s inter-temporal ability to pursue Open Strategy are its technology prowess and organizational processes
that support openness.
The technology prowess competency
To further understand the ﬁrm-level assets that push companies either toward or away from open innovation initiatives,
we draw lessons from an analytical model developed by Appleyard et al. (2008). As developed in the model, the pivotal
competency that sways the ﬁrm’s strategic decision between open and closed innovation is its technology prowess relative to
its potential collaborators. Technology prowess is deﬁned as the ﬁrm’s ability to apply its knowledge stock to the innovation
initiative at hand. But because of the “ecosystem effect” explained below, even ﬁrms with superior technology prowess might
wish to collaborate to expand the market and lessen the uncertainty of sustained market adoption, because a supporting
ecosystem is more likely to rally around a larger user base.
In terms of a ﬁrm’s ability to capture value from its open initiatives, the model considers proﬁt levels in different scenarios:
cooperative, duopolistic, and monopolistic. It assumes there is a technology leader that initiates the innovation project. In
instances where the technology prowess of the leader’s staff overlaps with that of close competitors, the ﬁrms will produce a
similar product such that they will split the end-product market. The value to the user who consumes their end products is
determined by the ﬁrms’ respective technology prowess and by users’ speciﬁc needs, because users will have to incur a cost to
adapt the product if it is not perfectly aligned with their needs.
Depending on a ﬁrm’s level of technology prowess, it can be shown that a ﬁrm could become a natural monopolist even if a
competitor’s product were free, in the setting where the former ﬁrm’s product is so technologically advanced and ﬁts the
user’s needs so precisely. However, for other levels of the focal ﬁrm’s technology prowess, where their innovation capabilities
are so similar to those of the other ﬁrm, there is a willingness to cooperate in an open initiative. Although still positive, the
proﬁt level for the focal ﬁrm falls, as multiple ﬁrms share the proﬁts, but a supporting ecosystem emerges because of the
larger, joint market created by the focal ﬁrm and its collaborators.
The ecosystem effect of the Appleyard et al. (2008) model captures the willingness of an ecosystem to form in order to
support deployment of the new product. In the software sector, crucial members of a supporting ecosystem are the systems
integrators, like Accenture or IBM, who combine software and hardware into a functional system. If the lead innovator in an
open source software project were to close off the project too quickly, the market might be too small for systems integrators to
be willing service the market. Similarly, if the closed project does not open up enough it might be preempted by an open
alternative that siphons off support from systems integrators. This “mutualism” experienced by competing innovators reﬂects
a shared need for ecosystem support and provides a countervailing force to abandoning an open strategy.
Applying this intuition to the Google Android example from above, the switch from Open to Closed can be triggered by a
change in Google’s technology prowess. As Google’s technology prowess in software development has grown, not only
through experience working on Android but by hiring leading Android software developers into Google (Dahlander and
Wallin, 2006), Google’s payoffs approach the natural monopoly situation. This result is similar to a learning race where
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one strategic alliance partner learns more from the other partner than vice versa and then abandons the relationship (Kale
et al., 2000; Khanna et al., 1998).
The Closed to Open example of Cisco’s OpenDaylight project reﬂects the reverse dynamic, where a company with a large
lead it in its technology prowess is actively inviting other companies to collaborate, which effectively erodes its relative
prowess over time. In this case, Cisco is willing to share (cede) its technology prowess to avoid being disrupted in a
Christensen (1997) sense, while ensuring a say in the direction of the emerging de facto standard in software-deﬁned
networking (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The willingness of Cisco to share control of the project and become more inclusive
over time can be veriﬁed by monitoring the code contributions to important modules in the project. This monitoring is
possible because of the transparency of the source code.6
The organizational support competency
Another critical competency required to effectively execute Open Strategy is a ﬁrm’s ability to provide organizational
support for the open initiative (Herzog, 2011). Utilizing Open Strategy requires substantial attention to how a ﬁrm will
support the initiative across all levels of the organization (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; Dodgson et al., 2006;
Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Sieg et al., 2010; Whittington, 2006). Developing internal organizational processes that facilitate
participation is paramount, particularly for ﬁrms that are shifting their strategy from Closed to Open.
To understand the necessary changes in organization processes, we interviewed leaders from a cross-section of organizations within the open source software sector. These interviews reﬂect the evolution of open innovation projects, where
people no longer question whether openly sourced initiatives will survive, but instead are asking how their internal and
external processes need to evolve to fully deploy Open Strategy.
The process question becomes how to set the level of commitment to Open Strategy beyond merely opening up parts of
one’s product portfolio. Mike Woster, COO of the Linux Foundation, proposes four organizational strategies depending on the
ﬁrm’s level of commitment to the open initiative: consumer; participant; inﬂuencer; and initiator (Woster, 2014). The consumer
model expressly targets cost savings by adopting free and open source software, similar to consuming third party off-theshelf software. Participants typically pursue limited interactions with speciﬁc OSS communities, such as ﬁnding and proposing solutions to software bugs. Companies exerting an inﬂuencer strategy can sway the direction of the software project
with software contributions that extend or modify functionality (Dahlander and Wallin, 2006). Finally, initiators are
contributing software and building communities around it so as to make it a market standard, which often leads to the
commoditization of competitors in particular application areas (West and Gallagher, 2006).
This progression requires a conversion of organizational practices. One of the most extensive commitments to the initiatorend of the strategy spectrum by an established (proprietary) company has been by IBM. Not only has IBM contributed over $2
billion to the development of Linux (IBM, 2013; Wilcox, 2000), but the company reengineered its internal processes to sustain
Open Strategy. According to Dan Frye, the head of Open Systems Development at IBM for over a decade, they had to alter their
internal processes at both an organizational-level and individual developer-level to work with OSS communities (Frye, 2014).
Because of its crisis years in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mills and Friesen, 1996) and the company’s experimentation
with business models (Chesbrough, 2010), IBM’s senior leadership was responsive to understanding OSS and how to change
its processes to support a leadership role in the emerging ecosystems. While IBM’s OSS business model has increasingly
focused on the services it wraps around OSS, the company initially captured value by selling the hardware underneath, so on
balance, OSS was not seen as a threat (even though IBM had a sizable proprietary software business) but as an opportunity.
This garnered top leadership support and allowed Frye and his team to alter the processes necessary to establish IBM’s role as
an inﬂuencer in various OSS ecosystems, with the most noteworthy being the Linux ecosystem.
Another technology leader, Intel, similarly progressed through the participant, inﬂuencer, and initiator stages, once open
source initiatives were identiﬁed as a strategic imperative in the early 2000s. Like IBM, Intel had a large, in-house, proprietary
software group, and so organizational buy-in was critical. Imad Sousou, General Manager of Intel’s Open Source Technology
Center, observed that senior leadership gave two overarching reasons why it was vital for Intel to aggressively pursue OSS: 1)
A traditional business strategy argument around complements where better, more widely available software would support
mainline businesses (chip and server sales); and 2) If OSS could help accelerate the overall pace of innovation, then Intel
would grow with it (Sousou, 2014). For example, if OSS fueled burgeoning sectors like the Internet of Things (IoT), then Intel
would beneﬁt through the sale of more Intel chips. Furthermore, in the late 1990s, Intel faced instances of being constrained
by proprietary software vendors in the IT infrastructure sector that refused to support Intel systems, and so OSS allowed Intel
to circumvent those barriers. A few early and decisive wins of opening up software to promote the growth of other business
units within Intel induced organizational support of OSS (Sousou, 2014).
With strategic clarity came the need to deﬁne internal processes. Similar to IBM, Intel’s OSS vetting committee comprises
legal, business, and technical leaders from each major time zone. Hundreds of projects have gone through their review
process. Such a process allows Intel to analyze the growth potential associated with each OSS project, while mitigating the

6
An earlier example of an erosion of a leader’s technology prowess comes from the opening up of Mozilla. Originally intended to act as a proprietary web
browser, this technology lost its early lead to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. As noted above, once IE became more pervasive, the Mozilla project was put into
the open domain.
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risks and potential costs of infringing someone’s intellectual property or unintentionally disclosing a trade secret (Sousou,
2014). Sousou noted that pursuing OSS cannot be a distraction with a limited level of commitment, but rather part of a
sound business strategy, technically feasible, and without any licensing issues. And like IBM, Intel has had to modify its internal processes to work effectively as a member of OSS projects.
Discussion and extensions
In this paper, we have shown that the choice of how open to be in one’s innovation strategy is not a once-and-for-all
decision. Instead, we have presented evidence that while some projects remain open or remain proprietary over time,
other projects switch modes or even exhibit hybrid modes that blur the binary choice between Open and Closed. Understudied in the literature is the transition from Open to Closed, which we call reversion. Evidence of reversion, such as in the
Android operating system, might reﬂect the customer’s desire for platform stability after a network has grown large enough
to attract a supporting ecosystem, and the lead innovator, Google in this case, has amassed enough technology prowess to be
able to shift to value capture from market expansion. These dynamics have important implications for both the content
branch of Open Strategy as well as the process branch.
This paper proceeds through three layers of analysis. First, we consider the underlying payoffs to openness. The payoffs can
be categorized as consumer surplus, producer surplus, or even both when the innovator is the user. The allocation of gains can
shift over time which can trigger a shift in strategy.
Second, we analyze the user-, ﬁrm-, and market-level drivers derived from consumer and producer surplus that may cause
a ﬁrm to switch strategies. A synthesis of a subset of these drivers shows how customer preferences for product stability
versus feature variety can interact with the willingness of the lead innovator to relinquish some control over proprietary
assets. As the product market matures, legacy customers who likely prefer stability may prove more inﬂuential if fewer new
customers are entering the market, and this dynamic could ultimately lead to reversion.
But a strategic shift can only occur if the third layer of analysis supports it, where the third layer represents organizational
competencies. To be in a position to capture the value created in an open initiative, our analysis ﬁnds that competencies
spanning technology prowess and open-supporting organizational processes emerge as vital.
Ironically, a ﬁrm’s commitment to an open project might precipitate reversion over time. In the speciﬁc setting of
open initiatives that focus on innovation, the growth of associated knowledge assets leads to the deepening of the
technology prowess competency reﬂecting the accumulation of experience as well as the movement of top talent across
company boundaries. The ability of ﬁrms to grow their knowledge assets through these means during an open innovation project can, over time, reduce their need to collaborate with outsiders. Therefore, multiple forces might precipitate reversion and additional research is needed to assess their strength relative to the countervailing payoffs to
openness.
Conclusions and directions for future research
Open Strategy has evolved to encompass two primary dimensions: a process dimension that examines the effects of
substantially greater participation in the strategy determination process (Whittington et al., 2011); and a content dimension
that considers the sustainability of open innovation approaches (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). More recent proponents
of open innovation have celebrated the value of opening up (Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 2005), but issues of whether and
how this openness can be sustained have not received adequate attention (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007).
The possibility of switching strategy of being Closed or Open over time has been neglected by both the process side and the
content side of Open Strategy. From the process branch of Open Strategy, it is likely that at least some adherents of a much
more participatory strategy formulation process at a later time revert to a more restricted process. Understanding when this
reversion occurs will help to clarify the boundary conditions that enable Open Strategy formulation processes to thrive over
time. Within the content branch of Open Strategy, the underlying dynamics that a lead innovator might face with regards to
its technology prowess relative to a collaborator, coupled with customer preferences for stability or variety, might alter the
anticipated payoffs to a particular innovation strategy and cause the pendulum to swing back.7 The possibility of switching
content strategies also calls attention to the internal organizational practices of ﬁrms, and the range of payoffs that ﬁgure into
the calculus of whether to switch or not. Only future systematic analysis across industries will be able to assess the limits to
Open Strategy and open innovation more generally.
While our primary examples have been within the ICT and software sectors, we strongly suspect that these dynamics are in
play in other parts of the economy, meriting future research. Wherever there are extensive value chains, supported by surrounding ecosystems of complementary suppliers and third parties that require coordinating actions and investments, the
dynamics of the lead innovator’s motivations and the market’s characteristics are likely to apply. For example, in many
standards-setting battles, seemingly small initial differences can tip in the favor of a more open standard over a more
restricted one d or vice versa. The classic Beta vs. VHS example has been analyzed this way by Cusumano et al. (1992).

7
In software, open projects worried about being closed off can thwart such moves. The code can be forked into another version governed by an open
license, as happed to MySQL as it was being acquired by Oracle as part of Oracle’s acquisition of Sun (Pearce, 2013).
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Empirical research into standards organizations reveals a wide range of rules and a substantial role for discretion for the lead
innovator as documented by Lemley (2002), including the initiator proposing the standard.
The pursuit of Open Strategy necessitates the construction of business models that will lead to economic viability by
allowing participating ﬁrms to not only create but capture value. How value is created and captured can change over the life of
an open initiative, and in some cases, can lead the ﬁrm away from openness. Viable Open Strategy business models have been
demonstrated in the realm of open source software (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Perr et al., 2010; West and Gallagher,
2006), but parallel (or alternative) business models in other industries have received less attention. Software ﬁrms that value
time-to-market often opt for open source, but wrap proprietary add-ons (or services) around it. To help formulate a strategy
for portfolio balancing between Open and Closed products, companies like Red Hat are consulting with system integrators
like Accenture. These relationships deepen the software sector’s ability to determine when companies should pursue
(traditional) open source projects and when they should instead apply open source philosophies to internal, proprietary
development projects (so-called inner sourcing). Future studies can survey ﬁrms that participate in open initiatives to detail
where in the value chain they are capturing value and how Open and Closed products and services are co-existing in their
portfolios.
Not only have business models that sustain Open Strategy received limited attention outside of software, but few studies
detail the internal competencies a traditional, proprietary-oriented ﬁrm must develop to achieve openness. Two prevailing
competencies that we consider in this paper are technology prowess and organizational processes that will support the nontraditional strategic choice of Open Strategy (Barney, 1991; Chesbrough, 2003). As Chesbrough (2003) establishes, without a
supportive organizational structure, other competencies that are valuable, rare, and costly to imitate will not lead to sustained
competitive advantage. Delving into the organization processes including reward systems, promotion paths, and norms
governing interactions with others in open initiatives could help with the understanding of how ﬁrms are able to migrate
along the Open Strategy spectrum.
This research implies testable hypotheses that warrant further research. Future empirical research could speciﬁcally
analyze how technology prowess inﬂuences participation. As noted, we anticipate that accumulated technology prowess
would be expected to increase the likelihood of withdrawal from an open initiative and even possibly trigger reversion. One
can go about testing this hypothesis through a longitudinal examination of contributions to open projects, like the code
contributions made over time in open source software projects.
More generally, future research could test whether Open Strategy leads to heightened competitive payoffs. As noted, open
projects are anticipated to enjoy time-to-market, cost, and quality advantages, and these advantages would be expected to
translate into improved margins in the short-run and greater market capture and proﬁtability in the long-run. Open projects
that embrace transparency like open source software publish who is contributing to which modules of the project. Such
information aligns the varied interests of developers, users, complementors and third parties within the ecosystem,
improving performance while reducing cost and accelerating time-to-market. The projects that switch their modes over time
face the possibility of misalignment with one or more external parties as a result of the switch. The presence of alignment or
the potential for misalignment may affect the performance of these projects and hence the ﬁrms supporting these projects.
Parties who are no longer properly aligned with the new mode may suffer diminished performance, when compared to others
who have aligned themselves. Comparisons of product market performance, proﬁtability, and stock performance between
member ﬁrms of an open initiative and matched non-member ﬁrms offer metrics by which to judge the advantages of
openness. For example, stock price performance might be assessed following a switch in mode from Open to Closed or Closed
to Open.
Another interesting research question is the apparent lack of concern exhibited by participants in open projects that are
reverting to a more proprietary approach. One might expect volunteer contributors to these projects to have strong, negative
reactions to this reversion, and this anticipated effect could be tested, for example, by analyzing patterns in code contributions
in open source software projects that are starting to close off. Countering the expectation that volunteer contributors might
curtail their contributions, we have found only modest evidence of defection in response to reversion in our interviews with
leaders in the OSS arena.
It is clear that open innovation is an inherently dynamic process. Strategies to support open innovation must similarly
incorporate dynamic elements if they are to reﬂect the reality of today’s technological world. For both reasons of rigor and
of relevance, we hope others will pursue these dynamics in future work on both the content and the process of Open
Strategy.
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